The Image of Ethics (Part 5)

When I talked right at the beginning of this talk on ethics, and said it seems to me that any really valuable and viable approach to ethics nowadays would need the following things, and a list of seven or eight sort of items of a wish list, and I've sort of been following that thread through this whole talk, I mentioned ontology and epistemology as one of them, or considerations around ontology and epistemology, explorations around ontology and epistemology. So I've already in this talk, in the parts of this talk, woven in questions of epistemology and ontology, and ideas, and possible new ways of thinking about ontology, epistemology, and how that might be worked into older ideas to adapt them, modify them, open them out in a different way, allow them to deliver something that they otherwise would not be able to deliver to us today, etc. Of course, I've talked a lot and written about ontology, and talked a lot about it in previous talks. And some of "Sila and Soul" was also devoted to ontology and epistemology regarding ethics, regarding values and virtues and all that.

So nowadays, in our postmodern culture, or culture of postmodernity, you know, most people who think about these kinds of things, I think, like philosophers, would probably tend to agree that it's impossible to come to conclusions around ontology, that it's a kind of intrinsically inconclusive subject. But as I've pointed out several times now, here and elsewhere, ontology and epistemology are inevitable to our lives, to living our lives, to making choices in our lives, and they're also inevitable to any moment of consciousness, I would say. We're always making ontological and epistemological assessments and judgments about what we sense, what we experience. We can't really avoid it. It's there anyway, and it's having an effect anyway.

Ontology and epistemology are there anyway, in any moment of our consciousness, and certainly there in our lives, certainly there in regard to our practice, our Dharma practice, certainly there in regard to ethics in some way or another. They're unavoidable. They're having an effect. They affect everything. They affect what we choose. They affect how we think. They affect our orientations. And the question is, or a question then becomes -- always, always this question: what does the ontology and what does the epistemology that I am holding right now lead to? What does the ontology and epistemology that goes with my [Dharma practice], underpins my Dharma practice, what does it lead to? What does it open? What does it close? What does it bring? What does it deliver? And the same thing for Soulmaking Dharma practice, etc. In Soulmaking Dharma practice, we can entertain different ontologies and epistemologies, but always this question: what does it bring? Which is a different question -- it's related, but it's a different question than just, "Is it true?"

So we can have different attitude and orientations to ontology -- indeed, we do, of course. And there's a whole range there. I think in this talk what I really want to do is, in a way, in terms of my aims and the scope of this talk, it's not too different from what I've done in the past, which is, I guess, three things, really. (1) One is just bring to light and mull over and discuss things, ontological questions and issues, and epistemological questions and issues, that we need to consider, that we need to at least acknowledge and realize. Just to bring them to light and acknowledge and realize them, see that they're in the picture, and discuss them a little bit. (2) Second thing is to, so to speak, elbow enough room philosophically from entrenched and usually unquestioned ontological and epistemological assumptions. So just people tend to believe, or we as human beings tend to just believe this or that about what's real, or about what constitutes valid knowledge. And after many years of modern philosophy, and Dharma, and modern physics, etc., a lot of that is no longer actually tenable as 'true,' a lot of those old assumptions, those entrenched ontological and epistemological assumptions. They're not really viable. So that's the second kind of aim: to elbow enough room, and enough space to be creative and to discover with it, to see: are there other ways forward? But also, what might just be allowed because of that space, so that something is not being illegitimately strangled out, illegitimately prevented from taking a viable place in our life, in our consciousness, in our practice, in our view? So that's a second thing: just to elbow enough space.

(3) And the third is, yes, to offer (lightly) possible alternative ontologies and epistemologies -- but I do say 'lightly,' because this elbowing of enough room, the second kind of aim, and this third aim of offering possible alternative ontologies and epistemologies, doesn't equate to an assertion of any definite ontology or epistemology. But just doing enough that we can move forward, create/discover ontologies, epistemologies, and attitudes that allow us to move forward, create and discover, with regard to values, with regard to ethics, with regard to soulmaking. That means with regard to our lives, and what's really important in our lives.

So let's start with a few considerations. [8:55] If we take Buddhadharma, and especially Pali Canon Buddhadharma, the sense, the reading I have there, is really that virtues and values, whatever you might call them, they have karmic effects. I'm not even talking about future lives; I'm talking about in this life. They affect the citta, the tenor of the citta, the quality of the citta, the perception of self and other, all that. And that's what's important. So the ontology is just that much ontology: "Well, they have karmic effects," and that's what's important for Pali Canon Buddhism, for Theravādan Buddhism, as it's most usually read.

In the Mahāyāna, there's much more emphasis on the emptiness of phenomena -- so including the emptiness of qualities of the citta; including the emptiness of values and virtues and all that. We talk about the two truths: the ultimate truth of the emptiness of these things, and the conventional truth of their relative reality -- the ultimate truth, relative truth or conventional truth, conventional reality. So they are empty, those values, virtues, all the rest of it -- completely empty. It's emphasized, and acknowledged, and taught, and studied. But at the same time, at the level of relative truth, the level of conventional reality, they function. They function. As I said, there are karmic effects from different values or virtues, or vices, or disvalues, etc., so that the emptiness is, in a way, not so much an issue. The ontological fact of the emptiness of virtues and virtuous qualities of the citta is not so much an issue.

In the Vajrayāna, again, there's a huge emphasis on the emptiness of these things. There also seems to be this, in tantric texts and Vajrayāna teachings, this depiction or teaching of a kind of encouragement to transgress against what is valuable and what is virtuous, etc. Now, that's a complicated subject, but oftentimes the commentaries, or most usually the commentaries explain that that transgression is really symbolic, that "to kill your mother and father" means so-and-so; it doesn't mean literally to kill your mother and father. Mother and father symbolize this, and killing them symbolizes that.

So just like in the -- well, certainly in Pali Canon and Mahāyāna Buddhism, we could say the same from a Soulmaking Dharma perspective. We could say or think similarly: just what is the effect of values and virtues? What's the effect of relating to them, taking them seriously? And what is the effect of ignoring them, of just considering them empty? So that's the important question. But actually that question is not quite put precisely enough, because the effect of virtues and values, if you've been following everything we've been saying in this talk, the effect depends on the conceptual framework of them, and depends also on my relationship to them. Am I allowed, and to what extent am I allowed, an erotic relationship with values and virtues? And what is my conceptual framework? And does that conceptual framework give them a rooting in another dimension, etc.?

So if we go a little bit further with this, we could break down, broadly, the ontological approach in Buddhadharma -- not quite so clean-cut, but let's say two attitudes. One is what you get in Pali Canon Buddhism, as it's most commonly read, and certainly as it's read through the Abhidhamma, for instance, and Theravāda: the virtues and the values, these are 'real' things. The virtues, certainly, are 'real' things, or they're 'real' components of a mind moment. So Abhidhamma, usually, what it does is really categorize a number, and actually gives: "There are these many qualities of mind. These are the possible qualities of mind of any mind moment," and it lists them, and there's a certain number, and it's this number and not another number. So Abhidhamma categorizes a number or the number of possible qualities of a mind moment. But there, in the Abhidhamma, the moment and its mental qualities are viewed as real. They're viewed as inherently existent. And it was this view of inherent existence to which Nāgārjuna objected. A lot of his texts are really polemic attacks on that kind of reified view of the reality of virtues, the reality of mind qualities and mind moments.

But our question right now is: what does such a realist view, as we find in the Abhidhamma, what does it do to our relationship with ethics and virtues and values? Because, in the language that we've been using, it gives them reality. Yes, it's great. They're deemed very important. But the whole thing is conceived of in what we would call a flat way, a mechanical way -- almost a cold way. These things, these mind moments and these qualities, do not have soft and elastic edges. There's something limited in that view and limiting. It does not allow, or it allows very little scope for eros or soulmaking in relationship to ethics. There's no real sense of dimensionality, of infinity, infinitude. It's quite a poor sense of the human being. We've touched on all this.

But that would be kind of one end of a certain view, of a certain Buddhadharma view, just taking this kind of very realist view, and quite a mechanical model. At another end would be just a kind of view: "Oh, everything's empty, including virtues, and mind states, and values, and all that. It's all empty. Ethics is empty too." So I think one of the things that's really important here is to question any kind of immature or too hasty relativism regarding ontology and epistemology of ethics, any immature or too hasty kind of nihilism regarding ethics. So we've touched on a little bit of this before, I think, in the "Sila and Soul" talks, and also here.

You know, several people have pointed out, including, I think, the philosopher W. Stace, just because people have not been able to conclusively prove an independent existence of ethics, it doesn't mean that there isn't an independent existence of values and of morality. Just to conclude that from the fact that, so far, human beings have been unable to do that doesn't actually logically follow. And similarly with a kind of scientistic view, based on "what's real is only what's measurable and material," and this kind of reductionist scientific view, and there's no place in that for questions of value, or our feelings towards value. They're all just illusory. This is kind of just immature, partial, blinkered thinking. Ethics exists for human beings, and as long as there are human beings in the universe, ethics has a reality, because there are human beings. So just because it only exists for human beings doesn't mean that it has less reality. This goes back to Descartes and Galileo and all that. Or, you know, someone like the philosopher Richard Rorty -- we talked about him as well -- sort of dismissing any ontology or epistemology underlying ethics, and then just insisting what we need to do ethically is just keep the conversation going: "We need to keep the conversation going." Well, why? Why do we need to keep the conversation going? That's an ethical assertion, and on what are you basing it? But because he's ruled out from the beginning any possibility of basing ethics in anything else, in any other dimension, or value giving dimension, he can't answer that. So a lot of the time, he just kind of talks in circles.

And we can have a kind of similar immaturity in bringing the teachings of emptiness to bear on the whole domain of ethics. Actually, before I get on to that, it seems to me -- and I've probably said this elsewhere -- it seems to me that those who emphasize, whether they're in the Dharma or outside of the Dharma, those who emphasize the impossibility of knowing any dimension or ground for ethics, for virtues, for values, are at the same time clinging (sometimes explicitly; more usually, tacitly) to the classical scientific materialist view of reality. So, very postmodern in the domain of ethics and other domains, but underneath that, or in other areas of life, just actually really clinging on to the classical scientific materialist reality -- very not postmodern.

[22:02] So anything that sort of Cartesian/Galilean science posits or explains as real is real, in this view, and anything else -- for example, ethics or values, etc. -- is not. But we talked about Descartes -- actually, that came just from a decision in the first place, and Galileo also made a decision, and it became a truth. But then, eventually, even the whole scientific method, which they helped to start, sort of ended up pulling the rug out of their starting modus operandi and their starting definitions.

And we also pointed out how those definitions about what was real, and how that scientific methodology, over time -- it started with people who were religious. Yes, Galileo was subject to the Inquisition, or oppressed by the Inquisition, but they were still religious. Descartes was a very religious person, and in fact, a lot of his so-called logic relies on the existence of God. The taken-for-granted existence of God proves other parts of his logical edifice. He had all kinds of doubt; that's his sort of Cartesian scepticism. But one thing he didn't doubt was the existence of God. Galileo and others, Locke -- these were all genuinely religious thinkers, and what they started was rooted in and motivated, even, by religious thinking and religious aspiration, to a certain extent.

But then, over history, as we've traced a little bit in this talk, over history, following that thread about, "Okay, this is real, and that's not," etc., and then all kinds of implications and consequences -- including implications and consequences for ethics -- unfolded through history, over several hundred years. One step was taken, and it in turn, in time, implied another step, or together with certain social developments, it implied another step, etc.

But anyway, if we come back to emptiness, it's really important to realize: knowing the emptiness of all things, understanding in one's heart the emptiness of all things, does not, will not lead to a nihilistic morality. It absolutely won't -- at least not the way I understand it. I've said this before. Emptiness means things are not real. It also means things are not not real. Neither real nor not real. And to me, the indicator of insight into emptiness is care, is even an increase in care -- care for others, care for the world. An indicator of insight is the presence and even the increased felt sense of importance of values and virtues. An increased orientation to them, not a decrease; not a letting go and a negligence. An increase in compassion. These are the indicators, to me, of insight into emptiness. If that's not there, and someone's talking about emptiness, either I'm not interested, but if I'm in a teaching position, I'm very interested, because something's really not right. Something's off. It's not the Middle Way of emptiness. And I would also say, certainly in the way at least I would teach emptiness and the practices that lead to it, there's so much sensitivity required and cultivated in that path of practice, that I think sensitivity to, including heart sensitivity and ethical sensitivity, all that will grow in the course of deepening one's insight into emptiness.

So we've talked about a lot of this before. And sometimes people say, when they hear about the emptiness thing, "Oh, but everything's empty, so I won't care about ethics," etc. Just very briefly recapping what must have been, I'm assuming, the first talk of this series, the talk on emptiness and ways of looking. In the way I would teach emptiness, with ways of looking and fabrication, we're not starting with asking anyone to believe the emptiness of all things. That would be really unwise, and usually then almost everyone would say, "But then I wouldn't care," or "Then nothing would matter." They don't really understand. They're not ready to jump to that level. We start with these two threads: the possibility of ways of looking, the possibility of developing flexibility of ways of looking, and the notion of the fabrication of suffering, of self, eventually of world, of objects, etc. We start even just with the notion of fabrication of suffering, and then have a look how the self is, etc. And just start with those two possibilities, which almost no one can deny, and you explore. It's an open-ended, experiential, firsthand experiential inquiry, rather than starting by believing something, and then kind of acting ethically on this belief that I don't really understand -- 'open-ended' meaning one doesn't decide the limit of fabrication or one doesn't pre-decide that everything is empty, everything is an illusion. One doesn't know what that means yet.

Secondly, we said emptiness ways of looking, as you develop lots of them, are just then different lenses, different ways of looking that we can pick up and put down at any time, based on or responsive to the needs of the situation: what helps to reduce suffering here, if that's my intention, for self, for other, for world, etc.?

And we also said it might be, in other ways of approaching emptiness -- (1) through analyses, or through intellectual analyses, practices they do in the Gelug tradition in Tibet, (2) or through the idea of some way of practice where emptiness gets construed as a sort of big, empty space, with insubstantial objects and not much self, (3) or the sort of one kind of interpretation of a Theravādan view of emptiness as the machine-like process of aggregates -- none of those, none of those three, will automatically weave in, integrate, have integrated in them the understanding and the exploration of dependent arising, which is the exploration of karma, and how this intention, that way of looking, this way of acting actually brings about this sense of self, this sense of world, this much suffering, this kind of suffering. We're seeing dependent origination and karma work right then when we're approaching it through the ways of looking/fabrication way. So ethics is integrated, unavoidably, right from the beginning. Karma is integrated, unavoidably, right from the beginning, into the emptiness exploration, into the emptiness teachings. And it's something we see and know and feel firsthand. That runs all the way through, as opposed to teaching emptiness in some way, and then somehow now we have to stick back ethics in it because we're concerned that what we've done with emptiness might imply that ethics is irrelevant, or we might have forgotten about it. Anyway, that's all repeat.

But we need to be careful, again, with the whole emptiness thing, also not to be lazy and sloppy -- and there are many ways we can be, and certainly around the relationship of emptiness and ethics. So ethics are empty, therefore ... what? Just because there's no universal agreement doesn't necessarily imply that ethics are empty. What do I even mean when I say "ethics are empty"? This we've already said. But even take something like "killing is wrong." So, "Ethics is empty, therefore it's not true to say killing is wrong, or it doesn't apply." But just going into it even a little bit more carefully, we'll see that actually, in relation to the notion of killing being wrong, there's always, in all cultures and societies, what's interesting, or, if you like, where the emptiness resides, is in the question, "When is it deemed okay to kill?" So it's not a blanket sort of sloppy, "Killing is wrong," or "No, because ethics is empty, and everything is empty, killing is okay. It's neither wrong nor right." It's in the detail. When is it deemed okay? You know, we put to sleep a pet that we love. There's the question of euthanasia. There's the question of -- what's it called? -- assisted, dignified dying, assisted suicide, when someone's terminally ill. Is it okay to kill when you prevent a murderer, you prevent a mass murderer, or you prevent someone like Hitler? You know, all these questions. Is there such a thing as a justifiable war? This is where it gets interesting. And then just to say "ethics is empty," we can still say ethics is empty because those details are hard to work out, and maybe we cannot arrive at a very clear, final, definite conclusion to some of these questions. That's where the emptiness resides.

Or, similarly, again, if you think, "Oh, everything's empty," okay, well, is 2 + 2 is 4, 2 + 2 = 4, is that empty of the truth? Is that empty of being true? What's the whole relationship between truth and emptiness? You could say 2 + 2 = 4 is dependent on counting to understand it, and you could even say 2 + 2 is 4, in order to be a truth, is dependent on the specification of the base, the numerical base, for example, in -- what's that? -- it's base 10, isn't it, we call that? But in base 3, 2 + 2 = ... what would it equal? It would equal 11. 2 + 2 = 11. You could say 2 + 2 is 4 is dependent on perception of 2 and perception of 1, etc. You could say all that. But any of those qualifications and dependencies don't deprive the equation 2 + 2 = 4 of a certain inviolable and non-empty truth. And it may be similar with ethics. There may be lots that is dependent on individual or cultural perspectives, and, as we said, on just the fact of human being. They're truths for human beings. But it still might be the case that Hartmann's firmament of values may have an absolute, relatively independent existence, reality, truth to it.

So, two things here. One is that when we use the teachings of emptiness, it's really important, whether it's in regard to ethics, certainly in regard to ethics, but also in regard to soulmaking and imaginal practice, to me it's important not to be sloppy and lazy. So that's one thing. And the second thing is, with regard to ethics, you know, the ontological and epistemological questions and issues and needs surpass what can be provided by just the notion that things are empty. We said, yeah, for liberation, emptiness is enough; for lots of other things, it's not enough, as an ontology. We said that in one of the early talks of this series. I also said ontology, epistemology, ethics, emotions, these areas of our existence -- and they are areas of our existence; they're not just philosophical areas, as I said. Ontology, epistemology, ethics, emotions (there are probably others) -- they're endless. I don't think humanity will ever come to an end of their exploration. And what did I say? It's like, if someone says, "Oh, I've figured them all out," or any one of those, "I've figured ontology. I've figured it all out," or epistemology, or whatever it is, run away from that person as a teacher. And if someone says, "Don't bother. It's not interesting. It's not useful. It's a waste of time. There's no point. Just ignore ontology and epistemology," I would run away from them as well as a teacher.

So, as we said, really right from the beginning, I think, in the Soulmaking Dharma teachings, ontology and epistemology, or considering ontologies and epistemologies and questions and issues there, really supports soulmaking. It really gives ground to, opens up space for, and also furthers soulmaking practice and soulmaking possibilities. Soulmaking needs ontology and epistemology, and I would say ethics too. Actually, by this point, you might have got the sense that ethics is just a part of soulmaking. Soulmaking is an approach to ethics, but ethics is definitely a part of soulmaking. Soulmaking, and therefore ethics, needs ontology and epistemology. It needs us to turn that soil, to mull over, to be creative, to discover, to question, to open up, to play and construct. And ontology and epistemology, like ethics and the area of emotionality, all these areas, all these domains can themselves become erotic-imaginal objects for us. Our relationship to them, in themselves, can become soulmaking and soulful.

So I think these areas are endless. And I hope, my hope is that others -- someone, or some others in the future, sometime in the future -- will add to what we've been developing here, and develop it further, and build on it. I think we need to, certainly in Soulmaking Dharma (again, ethics is a part of that), we need to, and I would say any ethics really needs to include ontology. There needs to be the inclusion of ontology. So I would say Soulmaking Dharma needs the inclusion of ontology, but, let's say, inconclusively -- in other words, in this open-ended way. And it might be the same with regard to anyone trying to move forward with ethics these days. The ontology needs to be included, but in a kind of inconclusive way, maybe. But in a way, that kind of attitude to ontology and epistemology is kind of axiomatic to and fundamental to Soulmaking Dharma.

We can look back in history and, let's say, the kind of literalism, ontological literalism of the belief in God in the ancient Judaic tradition, for example, of the Old Testament. Or that kind of ontology, or Plato's ontology, or Descartes's, or Galileo's ontology, or Bacon's, which is very similar, of course, or a kind of monistic materialism -- "There is nothing but matter. Mind is really just material" -- that kind of ontology, or the notions of truth that Karl Popper put forward, etc. All of these, over history, seem to have flourished and then kind of run into problems, gone out of fashion, failed, fallen short in some way. And again, we can have that sort of, what in some postmodern circles becomes a kind of widespread view, which is, "Oh, just forget the whole thing about ontology." Or we can say, "Still we can move forward here. Still we can play. Still we can create and discover. Still we can ask questions."

[42:13] So as I said, regarding or relative to ethics, it's important that the ontology and epistemology is very related to the dimensionality. It's the ontology and epistemology of dimensionality, in part, that's really crucial in the ethical question, in the question of ethics. And it becomes important to establish (is that really the right word?), to construct, create/discover, provide, explore, as I said, elbow space for, against the usually default sort of indoctrination of ideas around ontology/epistemology, with regard to the dimensionality, or whatever ways we're trying to give dimension to values, to virtues, to ethics.

In the "Sila and Soul" talk of the Four Parables of Stone and Light series, we spent a long time talking about the notion of ideal reality, or the realm of ideas, started with Plato. And Hartmann -- we spoke a lot about his moral philosophy, and Hartmann as picking up the notion of ideal reality, or the realm of ideas and values being a part of that, the realm of values being a part of the ideal realm, the realm of ideas, and the ontology there, and pointing out that, as I said, they exist for human beings, but that doesn't mean that they're not real. Hartmann would say just as geometrical laws exist just for spatial figures, and physiological laws exist for organic beings, well, moral laws exist for human beings. So it doesn't take anything away from that reality. This geometrical law, it just is true. It exists. But it only exists for spatial beings. Geometrical law has nothing to say whatsoever about anger, for example. No geometrical law has anything to say about anger.

I can't remember if I said this in the "Sila and Soul" talk, but for Plato and Hartmann, the realm of ideas, which includes values, exists. It has ontological validity. It exists as a kind of reality. For Plato, the realm of ideas, the realm of forms, was more real than any instantiation of that form. So beauty, as a kind of ideal reality, was more real than any material instantiation of something that was beautiful. Now, that's a very rare perspective and opinion and ontology these days. Someone like J. N. Findlay, who I've talked about in previous talks, he upheld that kind of inversion of the usual ontological hierarchy, that instantiations of things were less real than the idea, the ideal realm. And I paralleled that in the realm of mathematics and talking about the number pi and other things. We also, earlier in this talk, talked about the possible etymology or phonetic relationship between the words 'virtue' and 'virtual,' meaning something that's an image of something more real, and the thing itself is more real; the image is less real. So our virtues in the world are just an image, a copy, a not-real copy of something that's more real -- a real, a really existing virtue or value. And 'virtually,' the word 'virtually,' possibly being interpreted as connected by something -- it's not quite the real thing; it's virtually the real thing. Do you remember we talked about virtual reality? That would be the image, and 'virtually': almost, not quite the real thing.

So Plato had this, what sounds to most people today, very unusual ontology about this level of the realm of ideas being more real than the level of [knocks on table] material reality, and things, and tables, and horses or whatever it is. For Hartmann, the level of ideal reality was less real. It's still real and had a kind of reality, but actually less real.

Ideal being [he said, was] "a 'thinner', floating, insubstantial being, half-being so to speak, [he wrote,] which still lacks the full weight of [proper] being."^[1]

'Being' being what is [knocks on table] material, primarily. So in his view, there was a kind of hierarchy of what was most real, from inorganic being, and dependent on inorganic being, there was organic being -- so dependent on chemicals, there is life, some kind of living organism. Dependent on there being a living organism, there is mental being, so that's dependent on organic being. And dependent on mental being, there is spiritual being. And what he meant by 'spiritual being' was the whole realm of language, ethics, morality, arts, religion, law, politics, philosophy, ideology, historical consciousness, etc. That's what Hartmann primarily meant by spiritual being.

However, that view that Hartmann had has been brought into question. That hierarchy, which most people would agree with -- most people agree: the most real thing is matter, then kind of stacked on that hierarchy you get things that are kind of real. And then you get into this area of, "Well, they're sort of real, but not really real." And when you get to the values, a lot of people would disagree: "Do those have reality in themselves? Do those have an independent existence?" So Owen Barfield, as an example of a philosopher who questioned that whole typical hierarchy of reality, ontological hierarchy that Hartmann put forward, for instance in his Saving the Appearances. It's a well-known book that he wrote, just really pulling that apart. And again, developments in physics, particularly in quantum mechanics, really questioning that order.

And it's worth pointing out, too, that Hartmann really was quite strong in his criticism of Plato's hierarchical ontology there. For Hartmann, he thought that Plato's idea that if the ideal realm is more real, if the forms, these divine forms are more real than the things of this world, he thought that kind of philosophy will only lead, can only lead, to a devaluation and a disregard of this real world, of what Hartmann thought "This is real." If you believe some other realm is higher and more real, and this is kind of illusory, it can only lead to a disregard of this world. And it's possible. It's possible it can, and that it has, even -- that kind of philosophy has fuelled that kind of attitude at times in history. But when this world is the only thing that's real, and it's viewed in those material ways, and it's the only thing that's real, then we've seen what a poor ethics that can eventually deliver or leave us with.

Actually, the notion that there's an ideal realm, that there are, as I explained, these are the attributes of God, these are the divine intelligences, the divine angels, and that, in a way, they have more reality than this world -- this world is just an image, is just images and refractions of them -- or even that this world is completely real, too, but somehow has its origins in that ideal realm, it's not necessary, it doesn't necessarily follow that there's a devaluation of this material world and the things of this world at all. Actually, quite the opposite: it can be that because things reflect and have their roots in the divine and the divine attributes in this realm of ideas, that there's a greater sanctity to the things of this world. And even for someone who's very secular-minded -- imagine a physicist, and thinking this way about how everything has its roots in the mathematical laws of the equations that rule the universe, that govern the universe. There is, very often, a kind of sanctity that that level has in itself, the ideal realm of mathematics, but also a sanctity that it then bestows, a kind of level of sanctity that it bestows on the material things of this world, the everyday things that we encounter.

So I disagree with Hartmann that it necessarily demeans the things of this world and there will be a disregard and a devaluing of them. It's so often portrayed that way, and just taken as a sort of, "Well, obviously Plato's ideas would do that and lead to that." I really think this is one of the things we should question in terms of the implications of any particular ontology.

So a difference between Plato and Hegel there. And just staying with that physics thing for a while, like I said: if a quark, a supposedly fundamental particle, is only a thing for observers, it only becomes a thing in any sense that we would use that word, 'thing,' like as being somewhere at some time and having certain properties, like a certain mass, or a certain direction and velocity and all that -- if a quark is only a thing for observers, and kind of in itself there is only this ultra-complex, multidimensional mathematical idea, really, then, two things. One is, again, that would be an instance of a sort of ideal reality, having an ideal level, a level of the idea, the mathematical idea kind of having more reality than the actual instance of the quark, which only comes into apparent reality when there's an observer there. And indeed, there are some physicists today who say that, in a way, only those mathematical laws that govern the universe, they're the only things that are real -- matter is not real in the way that we understand it; what's real is the mathematical laws. Space and time and all that -- what's real are the mathematical laws. So there's that view. That's one thing. The second thing is, if this quark is only a thing for observers, and in itself, really all there is is this complex, ultra-complex, multidimensional mathematical idea, then the assumed ontological comparison with the reality of hard matter is softened. I mean, at the very least, it's softened.

We get a similar thing when we have talked about emptiness as providing a kind of minimum ontology for justifying Soulmaking Dharma, or justifying imaginal practice. We said, you know, oftentimes images will get dismissed ontologically very quickly, because something in the back of the mind is saying, "Oh, yeah, but it's not real," and an image is held in comparison with something that is assumed -- like whatever [knocks on table], this table -- assumed to be really real. So at a minimum, we can say, well, the emptiness of all things takes away any "really real." Yes, as we've said before, there's an ontological difference. There's a different ontic status between [knocks on table] this table and an imaginal table, perhaps. But as a minimum, what one's doing is taking away or reducing, dissolving a kind of backdrop object, object and objection to taking images seriously.

[58:58] And then, I don't know -- I don't know enough about Hegel's philosophy -- but it might be that some interpretations of Hegel actually allow the level of idea to have a kind of more fundamental reality, but it involves the material, and it plays out in the movements of the material, and the movements of politics, and the movements of all of that. So perhaps different interpretations of Hegel also may provide different configurations or reworkings of this whole ontological hierarchy question between ideal being, and so-called instantiations of ideal being, or reality as we usually think of it, or material being, etc. But that might be for someone else to pursue; I don't know enough about Hegel's philosophy, and there are very different interpretations. But the little that I know, it could be quite interesting, that actually the ideal being has more fundamental existence.

So, again, if we translate that to ethics, the value has more fundamental existence than the instantiation, and in Hegel's idea, the development of this value, the movement of this value, the history of this value is the primary thing, and it subsumes, if you like, the material and the historical in that. But really what's happening is there's an evolution of a value at the level of idea. That could be one version of interpretation of Hegel in relation to all this.

Again, we always have questions of epistemology, regarding anything -- regarding material things, regarding ethical things, meditative things, always. We can't get away from questions of epistemology. It's important to acknowledge, I think, with regard to virtues and values and ethics, even if a person says, "I ostensibly understand," or even seems to ostensibly understand, "it's difficult, it's impossible to prove the reality of values," a person has that view, but they're still acting and choosing according to their values. And what I would like to add to that is, Nietzsche said, "Well, yeah, most of that's just they're acting from indoctrination, from stupidity, from habit, etc. Their values are basically indoctrinated, and stupidity, and habit." A pretty critical view. But what I want to say is, we still act and choose according to our values. All human beings do. And it's not all because of fear and conformity. Something's happening in our choices, in our ethical choices, regarding values. We're trusting something. What are we trusting as an epistemic authority? What are we trusting as "I know this. I feel this way, or I think, or whatever it is"? What are we trusting? And usually, it's some sense, it's some felt sense, a moral sense, a conscience, a sense of nobility or beauty, some push or pull in the being, some sense of that. Could it be that anyway we're trusting something? And what we're trusting is some sense. And could it be that that 'some sense' that we're trusting is maybe the very beginnings of a kind of sensing with soul sensibility regarding values and virtues and the choices we make?

So I don't know -- is anyone entirely logical and rational in the substance and the basis of their ethical choices? Is there anyone who just kind of computes like a machine? I mean, people more or less, but I think there's always some sense, some moral sense, and I wonder if part of that moral sense has to do with a sense of what's noble, what's beautiful; something pulling me, calling me; something to which I push away from. And could that be the sort of very inchoate form, just the beginning, the germ, just a fraction, a portion of a soulmaking sensibility with regard to values and virtues?

We are trusting some sense, and I would say we do have some hierarchical differentiation between different values, contrary to what the utilitarians would say or allow us, or give any weight to, and also those who just interpret their Buddhadharma perspective as just saying, "Just reduce suffering, just reduce suffering." This "Just reduce suffering," this goal to reduce suffering or end suffering, is usually for something else, even if I haven't articulated what that something else is, even if I don't realize that it's for something else. When I gave the sort of thought experiment of that falling and then realizing there's no ground, how that would be, just to imagine that everyone's okay with that, and you've worked towards everyone being okay with that, just falling, the reduction of suffering is for something else in the end, or, let's say, past a certain point of reduction of suffering -- something that we feel is Good in some kind of ultimate way, worthwhile, beautiful, meaningful.

Some people are scared of this idea. Sometimes I've mentioned it to people who are very committed Buddhists, or they've heard me say it in a talk or something, "Maybe ending suffering or reducing suffering isn't the main thing, or isn't the final goal or whatever," and it seems like it really bothers some people. But again, my invitation is to just have a look. Have a look. Sense in. Feel in, if that thought experiment works for you, or something similar. Even if you're scared of the idea, see: is there not something else behind, underneath your concern and your efforts to reduce suffering, and your focus on reducing suffering? Isn't there something else, another level?

It could be that already what's operating for us, even if a person has never heard of soulmaking, or has heard of it and doesn't like it, doesn't practise it, whatever, it could already be that a part of how we are navigating our ethical choices is actually through the means of some very kind of inchoate and dimly sensed version of sensing with soul, of soulmaking practice with regard to ethics. It could already be that that's what people are doing, we are doing. Is it possible to develop that? Ontologically, there, though, epistemologically there, there's this: we're already trusting something. What are we trusting? How is it working in us? And is it possibly the case that what we're already trusting is the beginnings of a soulmaking approach, but we don't know that language, or we don't know that practice, or another part of our mind objects to it, but actually that's already part of what's going on, a part of how we're functioning epistemologically with regard to ethics and ethical choices and values?

So maybe that's already the case. And then maybe it's something that can be developed. We've already said, we've considered a couple of times already, the possibility of regarding eros as epistemologically valid, and as ontologically guiding and validating, or as John Milbank wrote, giving it an ontologically disclosive status. The eros, if we have a view of truth not as a definite this or that and a final arriving point, but more as this journey of provisional truths, as in fact is the actuality in science -- there's a journey of provisional truths, progressive stages of provisional truth -- and if we have that idea, and how congruent that is with the way eros works -- eros as what takes us, what galvanizes the soulmaking dynamic, which also means the perception, of course, psyche, the sense of what we're in relationship with, and the idea of it, the logos, and taking us more into depth. The eros is what opens up the depth, what opens us up to the depth, and the successive openings of successive disclosures of truth or reality -- but 'truth' and 'reality' just conceived a little bit more maturely, really, or differently.

So eros as epistemologically valid and also as ontologically guiding and validating, in terms of depth, but also in terms of direction. I would say there can be and there will be, with soulmaking practice, a trust of the compass needle, the orientation of eros -- not just that it will take me deeper, but also where it points, the direction. And all this is within the careful discipline of Soulmaking Dharma practice and sensibility. It's not just, "Oh, so truth can be whatever I like, or whatever you like?" No. We're talking about a real discipline here, and anyone who knows Soulmaking Dharma practice and really practises understands that, or should understand that. It's a difficult training. It's asking a lot. It's even asking a lot of people who have done a lot of meditative training before.

But again, I'm just wondering if actually what's going on for people anyway is the beginnings or the little, very partial fragment of or small version of soulmaking sensibility, sensing with soul sensibility anyway in regard to ethics. Okay -- can we fill that out? Can we give it more ontological and epistemological support in our thinking, elbow more room and provide possible ways of conceiving the ontology and epistemology that support taking that further, seeing what it does? And we already looked at how Soulmaking Dharma can give alternatives or modifications or sophistications of the ontology and epistemology with respect to the dimensions, or the ways of providing dimensions, through a notion of cosmic order or voluntarism. We looked at all that already, how Soulmaking Dharma can come in and just rethink those whole possibilities and put them on different ontological and epistemological footing.

It's interesting, for Hartmann. I was taken with this idea of a value-firmament and its hierarchy, but as far as I could find in what he wrote, he seems to state there just is an independent existence to the value-firmament and its hierarchy, the firmament of values. It's just that we can't grasp it all at once, and some people are not very talented at recognizing and differentiating values. Let's compare that kind of statement, going back to St Augustine, and something else he wrote in his text On the Trinity. He's talking here about his theory of illumination, the notion of illumination, where he really means that our minds and our hearts are basically open to the light of God, open to be illuminated by the light of God. They function through the light of God. The light of God, the light of the divine, permeates our hearts and minds. It's a beautiful idea. It's a beautiful image. And he writes:

God is wholly everywhere [from] whence it is that the mind lives and moves and has its being in him, and therefore it can remember him. Not that it remembers him because it knew him in Adam [of the Garden of Eden], or at any other time and place before entering the life of its body, or at the time it was created and inserted into its body; it remembers none of these things, whichever of them really happened to it, they are all consigned to oblivion. It remembers him by turning towards the Lord, as to the light which in some fashion had reached it even while it had been turned away from him. This is the reason why the wicked, too, can think of eternity and make correct judgments of approval and disapproval about human conduct. What are the rules according to which they judge, but the rules which show everyone how to live, even though they may not themselves live according to them? How do they know them? [How does a wicked person realize what's right and wrong?] Certainly not in their own natures: for although undoubtedly it is by the mind that these things are seen, it is clear that their minds are changeable, whereas whoever perceives in his mind these rules as the standard of conduct also perceives them to be unchangeable.^[2]

Again, there's this notion of eternal, independent, objective existence of these values and ethical rules.

Again, it is not any disposition of their minds [of the minds of the wicked, that they're able to do this], since the rules are rules of righteousness whereas their minds are, ex hypothesi [which is the whole basis of what we're saying], unjust. [So it's not through righteousness.] Where then are these rules written, where is it the unjust can discover what is just, where do they see what they ought to have and lack? Where are the rules written but in the book of that light which we call truth? Here it is that all the rules of righteousness are inscribed and it is from here that they pass into the heart of the just man, not by bodily transfer, but as though leaving their imprint on him, just as the design of a seal [like a wax seal] is impressed in the wax without leaving the seal.

So again, I don't know how all that language lands with you. I know some people will really object to it for lots of different reasons. I don't have that history, so I find it very touching, even though I may not agree with all of it. I can really understand how a lot of people are wounded through certain histories, and then that language really turns them off. But for me, there's something very beautiful there in this idea of an absolute light of God, as we were talking about the light of the prism the other day as an analogy, and then the attributes of God, like the refraction, the refracted light -- the different wavelengths are different colours, and the beauties of those different colours. And this idea of that light permeating our soul, permeating our mind, so that it's accessible to us, and these, the values, are eternal because they're part of that light, and they're accessible because that light permeates our consciousness, permeates our being.

But it's interesting. I just want to pick up a line there, because, to me, it's actually ambiguous what he means:

This is the reason why the wicked, too, can think of eternity and make correct judgments of approval and disapproval about human conduct.

So does he, by 'think of eternity,' mean 'think of hell,' for example, and the punishments that await them, and then fearfully repent? Or does he mean by 'think of eternity' something much more congruent with Soulmaking Dharma -- contemplating the timeless, or having a sense of the timeless in some way or other? And that sense of the timelessness opens up a sense of dimensionality, of divinity, of soulmaking, etc., which opens up the sensing with soul, which naturally opens up the sense of the ideational-imaginal and the dimensionality and divinity of values and virtues. So I don't know. Does he mean that? Does he mean actually timelessness, eternity in that sense? Or does he mean 'think of eternity and eternal punishment and eternal reward'? I have no idea, actually. I don't know enough of his work to know.

But even if he meant eternal punishment and reward in that sense, we could, again, Soulmaking Dharma could modify what he wrote there and take the beautiful idea, and this idea of something that is absolute in this sense of beyond all categories, beyond all attributes, like when people talk about the dharmakāya, or people talk in the via negativa about the nature of the ultimate Godhead, beyond anything that can be said about it, all that. And take that beautiful idea, and that light permeating our consciousness, and it's one of the elements of the imaginal that then opens up the whole sense. And within that whole sense, there will be a soulmaking sense of values, and they will have dimensionality, and divinity, and beauty, and duty, and necessity, and all of that.

So it's possible he meant eternal punishment and reward, but we can modify that, and then this beautiful idea -- for me, beautiful idea -- and even beautiful language that he's using can be modified from the perspective and the understandings of Soulmaking Dharma. But what it will lead to is a slightly different conclusion, I think, than what I think Augustine is implying, because it won't then imply necessarily always the same conclusions about -- we said this before -- an activity or a thing in itself, but rather this activity or that thing will be sensed with soul. And then implicit in that is the sense of divinity, and dimensionality, and duty, and the self's autonomy, the duty and my autonomy, beauty, creation/discovery, fullness of intention -- all that will be there. So not the thing in itself, but a different sense of this thing compared to that thing, this choice compared to that choice. And can we trust that, the fullness of intention, and all the other Soulmaking Dharma elements?

So there's a Soulmaking Dharma modification, perhaps, of what he said, probably, I'd guess, but I don't know, in terms of what he said, 'eternity,' 'the eternal,' 'contemplating the eternal.' But there's also probably a modification, as we've said before, in terms of where it delivers us to, in relation to. It won't be a universal, "This thing or that thing, this activity or that activity is taboo, proscribed or prescribed," but that what we're delivered to is a soulmaking sense of something, and of something over something else. And that can guide us. Can we trust that to guide us?

Also, I don't know if I mentioned this the other day; I think I mentioned it very briefly. You know, is there any place for antinomies in Augustine's view of ethics? We talked a lot about them in "Sila and Soul." But it may well be the case that, through a Soulmaking Dharma practice, soulmaking practice in relation to ethical choices, that antinomies are there, are felt, but they're resolved, they're solved for us through bringing the soulmaking practice to bear, because, okay, I appreciate that these are antinomies. There are two moral pulls in different directions. But I feel, for me, guided to choose this one. And I can trust that it's ethical, but I also know, I'm mature enough to know, that yes, that means I'm neglecting this other one. There's an antinomy there, as Hartmann says, and I emphasized so much in the "Sila and Soul" talks. We cannot get away from antinomies. I don't know if Augustine doesn't see that, or tries to avoid the whole issue. But Soulmaking Dharma practice, as well, helps us navigate those antinomies, and accept the inevitable guilt (if we're going to call it guilt), the fact that, in navigating an antinomy, in making a choice in life -- and I have to make a choice. I have to make choices in life. Sitting on a fence forever, as Hartmann calls that, that's really a sin. But I accept the inevitable guilt.

One example I've given several times, I think, is I wrote this letter to Dharma teachers, ten years ago, I think it was, about climate change, and about flying so much in the Dharma. I was fully aware there was a very strident tone, very critical and very aggressive. I perhaps even sounded arrogant. I was very aware of that. And I was aware that it was going to piss people off, and people would feel hurt. But I sent it anyway. And yes, quite a lot of people apparently were not happy at all. But I still, to this day, do not regret sending it. It was a soul-choice. I was tuning into the -- there was an antinomy there: to write it that way, to write it another way, to send it, to not send it. So it was soul that was guiding me, really, even though, at that time, my understanding of all that was much less clear to me, much less articulated, much less explored. It was really soul that was guiding me. And I fully accept that I was, in a way, neglecting, let's say, other moral values and virtues, through the tone of the letter and all that. Somehow it seemed necessary to write it in that way, in that tone. So I accept the guilt of neglecting those other values in the way that I wrote it.

[1:26:55] It may be, for some people, again, who are not that experienced in actual Soulmaking Dharma practice -- now, I know there are some people who have listened to loads of talks, and maybe all the talks on Soulmaking Dharma, but actually haven't practised much at all, or not in any way that it's really taken off and really made a big impact on their being in the practice. They may be touched by the talks, or, for whatever reason, they're listening; maybe [they've] heard other people talk about it. But if you're in that camp, you know ... I think if you've done a lot of practice, of soulmaking practice, this idea of approaching ethics with soulmaking sensibility and conceptual framework and practices, it won't alarm you. There may be some people it just sounds, "Oh, I'm really not sure. I'm really not sure. How do I know I can trust that?" Your practice hasn't matured enough to give you that trust in the whole paradigm yet.

And maybe, then, an experiment. If you're really interested in the question, "Can I trust this? Is this a way forward?", if you're really interested in the question, just take the trouble to do a little experiment, which might be: here's an ethical choice, and practise sensing with soul with regard to that ethical choice, as I said whenever I introduced it -- we said very briefly -- either through an image, an imaginal figure that comes up, or through the values and virtues involved as ideal-images. Practise sensing with soul that way in regard to that ethical choice without carrying out the action that that practice implies or suggests, without carrying out that choice -- unless the same conclusion as what the soulmaking practice suggests is provided via whatever your usual mode of approaching and judging ethical choices is. So you're not actually doing anything different. You're not doing or choosing anything different than you would usually do or choose, but you're adding this practice. And do that many times, with many different situations, and many different kind of choices, and see what happens. If you don't really care, you're not going to bother to do that.

But if you do care, if you're actually really interested in this question, "Can I really trust this with regard to ethics? Shouldn't we have another basis in ethics? Surely we can't put soulmaking as a basis for ethics. There must be ethics as a basis, then soulmaking, surely, especially when I hear you talking about all those weird images you have, Rob, of devouring beloveds, and blood everywhere, and ritual slaughter, and all that. Surely we must put ethics first, and then the soulmaking" -- if you're really interested in that question, actually do some experimentation on your own, as I've suggested. Do that many times, with many different ethical situations, and see. See if what happens is you don't learn to trust that actually the soulmaking could be a basis for the ethics. See. You'll know for yourself, and you won't have done anything differently in the course of the experiment. You're not being asked to do anything different than you would have done anyway or chosen anyway.

So one of the modifications -- it's, again, a very central modification -- that the Soulmaking Dharma paradigm brings, as we said, in regard to the Augustine example and others, and also Augustine's example of the cosmic order, was that it's no longer the thing or the action in itself, universally, that is decreed right or wrong, valuable or not valuable, ethical or not. It's the question of whether it's ensouled and ensoulable. So this is really important. Yesterday, we talked about the whole notion or the fact of this kind of, post-Protestant Reformation, this affirmation or elevation of 'ordinary life' -- work and production, and family, and children -- and historically, that equalization, let's say, of ordinary life, where it was, prior to that, perhaps seen as less valuable than a life obviously devoted to, consecrated to God. Then there was historically, post-Reformation, or with the Reformation, this equalization of ordinary life, this affirmation, elevation of it.

Originally, historically, we were seen as taking part in God's plan. So it mattered how we approached that, that we saw our ordinary life, and our work, and our family as really taking part in God's plan. And that plan, eventually it was connected with this more horizontal cosmic order. But anyway, we were taking part in God's plan. Over time, it became just ordinary life without any reference to God. Ordinary life was seen as valuable, as worthwhile, as, in itself, not just okay but important, as qualifying as 'the good life,' etc. But the reference to God had gone. There was a historical sort of evolution, devolution, development.

Now, with Soulmaking Dharma approach, what we're saying is it's not that it is or isn't that ordinary life is worthwhile, or Good with a capital G, or beautiful in itself, but it's how we sense it, and how we sense the things of ordinary life -- family, work, children. Are we sensing them with soul? Because when we are, then they're rooted in a sense, in our sense, our palpable sense of divinity, Buddha-nature, whatever you want to call it. But the ontology there is not simply objective, and not simply subjective. It's not in the thing itself as a universal: "The value resides universally in this thing for everyone, and that's just true." It's in the sense of the sensing with soul. It's in the soulmaking sense. That gives us the sense of divinity. But that sense of divinity is also neither simply objective nor simply subjective. Different ontology.

So, in a way, we're not really making a statement about ordinary life or family life and its value. What matters is the relationship. What matters is: is it sensed with soul? And that's, in a way, what it means, what makes it worthwhile, what makes it qualify as living, living a really worthwhile life. Soul is more than heart. It's what makes it beautiful in that way. So we're not saying for or against ordinary life or family life or anything like that. That's important. What's important is: is it sensed with soul? And that's the guide for how to live, what to live, what's worthwhile, which is this bigger question of ethics.

So we just said neither simply objective nor simply subjective -- that's the ontology that's wrapped up in all this, or that's underpinning all this. We could leave things there. But we could go a little -- I'm not sure it's further; just extend into a slightly different connection here, with the risk and probability of actually leaving things a little inconclusive, but I still think it's worth exploring a little bit. We've been considering ethical values, but we can also consider aesthetic values or beauty itself as a value too. I want to do so now, though I've spoken about it before and have written about it recently, which will be out -- well, not for a while, but sometime. And [I] emphasized, in both talking about it and writing about it, how important and instructive it is to actually inquire into beauty, and our notions of beauty, and our sense of beauty -- how important and instructive that is with regard to Soulmaking Dharma and practice, how intimate the connection is there.

So beauty is a value too. What's the ontology of beauty? And again, W. Stace and others can jump right in and say, "Well, the fact that you can't prove that this or that thing is beautiful, and the fact that people don't agree doesn't mean, does not imply, that there doesn't exist an objective, independent truth to beauty." Some people also nowadays would like to say, "Values, ethical values, are illusions, actually." There are different ways of saying that, or different explanations for why they think that. And they might say, "There's no such thing as beauty, really. What there is is a sense of pleasure." Again, Hartmann and others would say, "Well, beauty exists for human beings, just like values exist for human beings." And in Charles Taylor's words, you know, just as a best account of material reality includes things like quarks -- or our current best account includes things like quarks; to talk about and to explain how material reality is and what it is, our best account includes things like quarks -- our best account of our humanity and our human concerns must include things like values and beauty, because without them, without those notions, and without that kind of vocabulary, it's not just hard but actually impossible to choose and to navigate in life. We touched on this before. I might have an idea of "it's all just atoms" or whatever, or even "I'm choosing this because it's pleasant or unpleasant," but it's not really the best account of what's moving me in this or that situation, or how I choose.

So there are different ontologies with regard to beauty, whether it has independent existence, or whether it's completely an illusion, or whether it's neither wholly created by my way of looking nor fully, objectively, independently there. It's not just in the eyes of the beholder, but nor is it completely in the object alone -- this create/discovered, again, this kind of alternate ontology, alternative ontology. Remember quarks are participatory too. So the whole thing gets a little more, "Hmm, that's interesting." I'm not sure what the degree of prevalence, but certainly a lot of people who really think hard about quantum physics (because a lot of physicists don't think hard about quantum physics, but for the people that do), there's some portion that takes seriously the notion that quarks and everything else that is so-called 'material' is participatory. As I said, it doesn't exist independent of the observer, and how it is, and what it is, and where it is and all that depends on the observer. So it's an alternative ontology, this neither subjective nor objective fully, simply, but it may not just apply to things like values and beauty. It may also apply to material things, as we've talked about.

And whatever the ontological status of beauty and of values, you know, these things are deeply important to the soul, and somehow they're communicated, soul to soul. Beauty can be communicated soul to soul, and shared between souls, and a sense of value, and the beauty of value as well. How wonderful, how amazing this possibility of communication. How wonderful, how amazing the depth to which we can care about these things, to which we feel they're important. So it might be that there's a kind of ontological Middle Way with regard to beauty that's actually pretty similar to the imaginal Middle Way, and that's similar to one of the possible ontologies, the same kind of ontological Middle Way regarding values. That would be different, or in some ways of construing it, that would be different than Hartmann's idea of a firmament of values objectively existing, but actually, it could still be made congruent. It could still be made congruent. It depends on our notion of what the mind is.

[1:43:51] But it's interesting, too, if we just reflect a little bit on our culture, or where our culture is at regarding ontologies of, say, three different domains: mathematics, ethics, and aesthetics. So with regard to mathematics, I think most people in our Western culture would agree that there are independently existing mathematical truths, and also that there is a difference in human beings' kind of innate talent to understand those truths and to realize those truths, those mathematical truths, and also that some people are obviously much more trained than others are, and that we trust those people who are trained more than we trust the people who are not trained with regard to what's true in mathematics. But these mathematical truths are just widely regarded as independently true, whether you're a mathematician or not.

With regard to ethics, it's quite a bit more complicated. If we think about this question of ethos, of what's a really worthwhile life, what's a really beautiful life, then it seems, as I said, kind of almost fundamentally given in our Western culture to say there's no independent truth about that. No one can tell you what's a worthwhile life, what's a beautiful life. So there's quite a strong view that ethos, in that sense -- that's not really the right word, but ethics in that larger sense about what is a worthwhile life, what is really good, what is good -- there's no independent truth to that. When we shrink the domain of ethics down to the question of right and wrong, then people often, or what's very common is for people to say, "There is an independent truth. There is a truth here about what's right and wrong." The very fact that there's so much argument about what's right and wrong for so many questions and issues should make us wonder whether our sort of aggressive belief that there is a right or wrong is actually tenable.

And with regard to talent, etc., I think most people would probably believe that some, I don't know, psychopaths, or other people who have a mental illness, are not capable, or less capable, are a lot less capable, a lot less talented in recognizing right and wrong. And in regard to the area of ethics that has to do with what's worthwhile, what's a worthwhile life, what's a beautiful life, the idea of someone being more talented in that domain, or being better trained in that domain -- mm, it's not universally accepted at all; it's probably universally dismissed.

Maths, ethics, aesthetics. Then it gets also really, "Hmm, that's interesting." It seems to me -- I don't know; I was just trying to think this through. It seems to me, with classical art -- let's say classical figurative art, literature, music, classical music, classical literature, classical architecture -- people are often willing to admit "There's an independent truth there, but I'm not capable of judging it, because I'll leave that to the experts." So we agree that there's a training possible there. There's maybe talent possible in ascertaining these things. And there must be an independent truth, interestingly, and the expert knows that independent truth. When it comes to more contemporary kind of art, then it gets really more complicated and more -- I don't know -- messy, in a way.

Here's an interesting thing. I think if, if one cares really deeply about art -- and by 'art,' I mean all the arts, or I'm including all the arts -- but if one cares deeply about art, then one's relationship to art is actually related to what one wants art to do and to affect. Yeah? So if I really care about art, I'm looking to art for something. I want it to have certain effects. I want it to do something in my soul, or maybe even in the world, if I really care about it. And that, that question of what I want it to do, what I want art to do in my being or hopefully in other beings, that question is related to ethics in the sense of what I consider good, what I consider is a life worth living. It's connected to my sense of dimensionality and maybe even divinity.

So if I care deeply about art, I care deeply about what I want art to do. I have certain things that I want art to do, to affect. And that's related to my ethics in the larger sense of my sense of what's good, what makes a life worth living; my sense of dimensionality and all that, and existence; maybe my sense of divinity, even if I don't use that word, or say sacredness. And maybe, then, if all that's there, I tend to harbour a view that tends towards a sense of the independent existence of truths regarding both ethics and aesthetics. If I care deeply about art, care deeply about what art does and what it affects in my being, and hopefully in others' beings, and that's related to my sense of what's good, what's worthwhile, what's deep, what's really meaningful, what's really important in life, then it's often the case then that I harbour -- even if I conceal it a little bit from others -- a view that tends towards more the notion of the independent existence of truths about both what is ethical in the sense of meaningful and what constitutes a life worth living, and also what's of value aesthetically.

So, personally -- and I've said this before -- I cannot agree that, you know, the collected works of John Coltrane are equal in value to the collected works of the Smurfs, or even the collected works of Britney Spears or whatever. I just can't agree, really, if I'm honest. I can't agree. To me, there's a whole different order of value, aesthetic value, which touches on spiritual value, which touches on ethics. And John Coltrane, when I hear his music, when I'm open to his music, what it does to me, what it can do to me, and my sense of existence, my sense of soul, is totally related to my sense of what makes life worth living, and my sense of God, and my sense of dimensionality. So the ethics and the aesthetics are connected here if I care deeply about art. And I tend towards a kind of more realist view of independent existence of value there. I really cannot agree if you're going to say, "The Smurfs are just as valuable as John Coltrane."

But it's complex, because there's also, as I said, a kind of -- it seems; I don't know; I'm not really sure about all this -- there seems to be also a kind of taboo more widely about asserting an independent truth regarding the aesthetic worth for something that's non-classical. I mean, you get sometimes immature, "Oh, that's shit. That's shit," or whatever, and usually it's just because someone's unfamiliar with some form or some kind of new, contemporary music, or contemporary art. But usually the person that says that, art is not that important to them: "It's just shit." It's not coming from a place where art is actually really important to them, that's something that they spend a lot of time opening themselves to and resonating with and feeling. It's just that something is unfamiliar, so they just say "It's shit." They're not trained, in a way.

So, I don't know -- maths, ethics (in both senses -- in the wider sense that we've been trying to open up here: what makes life worthwhile? What makes life really meaningful? What's a life worth living? What is the beautiful life? What is really good that I should aspire to? And in the smaller sense of right and wrong), and aesthetics, value in art, or a part of aesthetics, the question of value in art, and whether that has independent, objective existence -- there's a kind of, I don't know, it's confusing when you look at the culture and where we are in the culture with these things. Why am I bringing this up? Partly just because of the interesting connection in ontology between -- we talked about maths, and the realm of ideas and the ideational-imaginal and values; we've talked about ethics' ontology, and then the corresponding ontologies of beauty. To me, that's just interesting. But I'm also bringing up the cultural question of where we are, where we tend to be, our society, the kind of views that are prevalent around all that, because Soulmaking Dharma is born, now, at this time in our culture, and so it's born into a set of or a soup, really, of ontological and epistemological views, and beliefs, and questions, and possibilities, but also unquestioned assumptions, and rigidities, and all kinds of things.

So it's quite interesting and relevant to also reflect, or to kind of get a sense of where the culture is on these questions of ontology and epistemology with regard to different domains -- maths, ethical domains in two senses, and aesthetics. It may be that someone listening to all this, or someone listening to even previous talks before the ethics, thinks, "Well, pffff, all this Soulmaking Dharma business and soulmaking practice, it's a bit elitist, isn't it? I mean, you have to have done all this other practice, and understand this, and you're talking about all this sophisticated philosophy and psychology and Dharma understanding. Isn't that all a bit elitist?" And there's a certain kind of reaction in relationship to that -- can be, born in a culture. And they may say, "Well, if you're trying to propose a Soulmaking Dharma approach to ethics, then that's really elitist. You're expecting too much from people. Only a very elite few would be able to do that."

So that's interesting. You think, okay, well, if that's the case, why is it not like mathematics, where you would give the ethical questions to experts, elite, those who are trained, or train yourself? And, you know, epistemologically speaking, giving something to an expert, or relying on an expert opinion, as I pointed out, I don't know, sometime or other in a talk, that's a kind of epistemology as well. We do that all the time with science. We do that with medicine. If the doctor tells me, "Yeah, your cancer has come back," how do you know? "Well, this and this and this," the blood tests and whatever. "This is the probable prognosis." I'm relying on the expert opinion, and we do that all the time in lots of fields -- primarily medicine and science, but, as I said, also classical art and classical literature. We just say, "Oh, so-and-so says this is good, so, yeah, it probably is good."

What about doing that with ethics? If we think it's elitist, it's not that simple. We acknowledge, as I said, for maths and for aesthetics, that there are experts, and they've probably had a long and difficult training that's necessary to reach that level of expertise, and maybe they had some innate talent or disposition or propensity to that area. And we give those questions and those issues to them. One of the reasons we don't do that with ethics, as well, is because it's going to affect my life and my choices much more directly, it seems, than questions of aesthetics or mathematics. I can't avoid it like I can avoid mathematics and I can even avoid art to a certain extent. I mean, soulmaking practice is not something anyone else can really do for you anyway. It's your personal practice.

But maybe, you know, politically speaking, socially speaking, in issues and matters that affect everyone -- so, for example, Heathrow expansion, or they're talking about this HS2 rail line, high-speed rail line, linking the south and the north of England, supposedly to more equalize the relative wealth and economic growth in the north and south, where it hasn't been equal so far. But in the process of even beginning to build this HS2 railway line, high-speed railway line, it's decimating ecological reserves and nature reserves, etc., some with endangered species and all kinds of things -- felling lots of trees, etc. Or, as I said, Heathrow expansion -- these kinds of issues that will affect a lot of people, or maybe even everyone. Is democracy the best way of deciding? I touched on this, I think, in the "Sila and Soul" talk. Maybe not any more. I don't know.

In a world of equal democracy, but there's Facebook and Google and who knows who, tracking my preferences and opinions online, and then feeding me both information and marketing according to my, in line with my history and my propensities, and not opening me up to other views, on top of which there's the spreading of fake news; there's Russian cyber influence and who knows [what] else; there's the whole unrestrained global capitalist market, global market capitalism and advertising, in a way promoting sometimes the lowest common denominator of desires. And even, like, deciding what's on TV or whatever -- how much does that come from a kind of democratic process? And is it necessarily to be trusted, for lots of reasons? And partly because, in ethical terms, as I've said through this talk, five parts or whatever it is now, we've kind of lost a ground for ethical thinking and ethical discernment. And certainly we've lost the ground, lost even the question and the space in the larger sense of ethics that I mean about really what's a worthwhile life, what's good, what's beautiful, what is a beautiful life -- we've just lost that. And so to hand it to 'the people,' and to a supposedly equal democratic process, is that really the best thing any more?

I don't know. It's obviously a really tricky question. I mean, if everyone were trained in sensing with soul, and educated in virtue ethics, approaching the soul that way, then democracy and these decisions, as much as the question of what is worthwhile, what is beautiful, what is really important, what makes a life worth living, they do bear on these kind of political, social, economic questions. So if everyone was trained in opening up that sense, and trained in discerning, then democracy would be a very different thing. Plato's Republic is one of his sort of major texts. He talks of this ideal society. It has a kind of spiritual elite -- they're specially trained and dedicated, and they do make decisions. This is really, you know, dangerous territory for Western culture, Western society, or a dangerous idea, a difficult idea, a repugnant idea for most people to entertain, the idea of a spiritual elite again. But is democracy really in such a healthy place any more? (Again, for lots of different reasons.)

I'm not sure what the answers are. But yes, in Plato's Republic, which actually just reads as a kind of fantasy novel, sort of a utopian opposite of George Orwell, there's a spiritual elite that maybe educate and dictate a hierarchy of moral purposes. But again, what would it be if that hierarchy was related to sensing with soul, and not to this thing or that thing, or the activity in itself? Tricky. Just to say, as well, it's not as if we don't have elites in our democracies or running our democracies, you know -- the ultra-rich. Thirteen men are as wealthy as something like 50 per cent of women in the Third World -- I can't remember, but anyway. The ultra-rich and corporations deciding laws and policies. That's in a democracy, and it already goes on. Or political leaders, Trump and Putin, and even Boris Johnson, who are very willing, and actually able, to disregard or even override democratic processes. So yes, we have this ideal of democracy, but it's also like, mm, it's sagging at best, and it's got some holes in it. So I don't know what the answers to all this are at all, and yeah, the idea of a spiritual elite is repugnant, but alarming to me also. But who do you want in power? It's not as if there aren't elites running things at the moment.

I don't know; these are just questions, as I said, opening up territory which is more inconclusive than conclusive. It would be wonderful if we were all taught, trained to develop practice -- if not Soulmaking Dharma, some other practice that helped us discern, and navigate, and relate to, and really be alive to and sensitive to the questions within this much larger notion of ethics. What is the beautiful life? What makes a life beautiful? What is really worthwhile? In what can I anchor my ethics? What sense of another dimension can I ground my ethics in -- my sense of what's not just right or wrong, but my sense also of what's worthwhile and beautiful? It would be wonderful if we were all trained to develop practices like that -- Soulmaking Dharma practice, or something akin to that -- that helps us in that territory, in that domain; helps the soul, helps the mind and the heart to be sensitive, to navigate, to have a compass, just as we are, most of us, or the ideal in Western society is that everyone is trained to some degree in mathematics, in reading and writing, to some degree in logic -- now even computer skills are part of the normal education at school -- and teaching mindfulness meditation in schools.

So a part of me thinks, oh, it's just a complete pipe dream that society would ever get to a place where these kinds of practices, and these kinds of tools and approaches, and this kind of way of thinking -- not to have to be exactly Soulmaking Dharma, but something akin that really allows our beings to bring our sensitivity, and our discernment, and our deep soul, and our deep intelligence to bear on this domain, on these questions. Partly I think that's a complete pipe dream. And yet, we have these other trainings that it really took a while to kind of establish as norms. I don't know if the mindfulness in schools is yet a norm, but it may well be soon. I don't know. So who knows? Maybe it's not such a pipe dream. And maybe, anyway, we don't have to wait for the whole culture to adopt something, to be established in a whole culture. We can start ourselves. And obviously, for ourselves, we can find out for ourselves, "What does this do to my image of ethics? What does it do, then, to my sense of existence, and my sense of navigating choices in life, responding to ethical situations, responding to social, political, economic issues, environmental issues? What does it do to my whole sense of my self and my life and the possibilities of my life?"